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ACCOUNTANTS-RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN CERTIFYING BALANCE
SHE T.-The defendants, a firm 6f public accountants, who were hired by
a certain corporation to audit its books, negligently certified a balance sheet
showing the net worth of the corporation as over a million dollars, whereas
in fact it was insolvent at the time. The plaintiff, relying on the balance
sheet, loaned money to the corporation. In allowing recovery for the re-
sulting loss, the court held, two judges dissenting, that the defendants owed
a duty of due care to all who might reasonably be expected to rely on such
certified balance sheets. Ultramiares Corporation v. Touche, 243 N. Y.
Supp. 179 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1930).
The generalization is commonly made, although frequently criticized,'
that one who negligently performs a contractual duty owed another, is
not liable for resulting injuries to a stranger to the contract.2 A considera-
tion of the present status of this doctrine of privity, however, indicates that
the once sweeping rule is gradually being abandoned. Those engaged in a
"common calling" were early held responsible for injuries occasioned by
negligence regardless of privity of contract.8 The same result has some-
times been reached when the contract involves a public duty in addition to
the contractual duty.4 And, under the "dangerous instrument" doctrine,
little now remains of the original immunity of a manufacturer, contractor,
or vendor if his negligence results in an injury to life or limb.5 Yet liability
for a purely financial loss, such as results from commercial certificates
negligently made, has been imposed regardless of privity of contract in
only a few specialized types of cases. In the United States a telegraph
company is liable to the recipient of a message for negligence in the trans-
mission though the message was paid for by the sender.0 And certain
jurisdictions hold a title abstractor liable to a third party who, he know,
would rely upon his certificate.7 But the attempt of Cann v. Willson8 to
extend the dangerous instrument doctrine to the case of financial injury
1 See Labatt, Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract (1900) 16
L. Q. REv. 168; Comment (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 607.
2 See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 115 (1842).
aPippin and Wife v. Sheppard, 11 Price 400 (1822) ; Bohlen, Afjirmativo
Obligations in the Law of Torts (1905) 53 AM. L. REG. 209, 219.
- Woodrury v. Tampa Water Works Co., 57 Fla. 243, 49 So. 556 (1909)
(failure to maintain adequate water supply under contract with city).
Contra: German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Co., 226 U. S. 220,
33 Sup. Ct. 32 (1912) (majority view).
G For a comprehensive discussion, see Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers
to Persons Other Than Their Inmediate Vendees (1929) 45 L. Q. REv. 343.0 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dubois, 128 Ill. 248, 21 N. E, 4 (1889).
The English rule is otherwise, but that the question is now academic in
England see POlLOCK, LAW OF TORTS (11th ed. 1920) 560.
7Anderson v. Spriesterbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166 (1912). Com-
pare a recent case, Cole v. Vincent, 242 N. Y. Supp. 644 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1930), where knowledge in the abstractor of the third person's
identity was held immaterial.
839 Ch. D. 39 (1888).
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to one relying upon a certificate of appraisal negligently made was over-
ruled by Le Lievre v. Gould.9 The only outstanding authority in support
of the instant decision is Glanzer v. Shepard,1" in which a New York court
recognized as a basis of liability the fact that the certificates of a public
weigher influence and are intended to influence the conduct of third par-
ties."1 In both this and the instant case the decisions accord with the
practical necessities of modern business which is becoming increasingly
dependent upon the statements of experts and professionals as a means of
economic control. The public accountant, long recognized as belonging to
a skilled class and liable to his client for negligence in the exercise of his
profession,'2 now pursues what, by economic necessity amounts to a public
calling.3 Although the result of the instant case might better have been
reached by legislation calculated to afford an opportunity to public account-
ants to make the necessary rate adjustments to the new risks imposed 4
the end, once achieved, must be approved.
ACTIONS-THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE RnEMiay.-
Two recent cases represent somewhat divergent attitudes toward the use of
the declaratory judgment as an alternative remedy. In Zoercher 1,. Aglcr,
172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930), the plaintiffs as taxpayers sought a declaratory
judgment to determine the constitutionality of a statute under which an
assessment had been made by the Indiana state board of tax commissioners.
The lower court found the plaintiffs entitled to declaratory relief and the
upper court sustained the propriety of the form of action. In the Pennsyl-
vania case of City of Williamsport v. Wiliamnsport Water Co., 150 Atl. 652
(Pa. 1930), the plaintiff city had in 1920 entered into a consent judgment
with the defendant corporation whereby it was agreed that the city "may
and shall" take over the defendant's waterworks at a stipulated price.
The consent of the city electors was a prerequisite to the transfer. After
9 [1893] 1 Q. B. 491 (building inspector's certificate). Similarly no
liability was imposed in: Humphrey v. Bowers, 45 T. L. R. 297 (1929)
(yacht inspector's certificate) ; Love v. Black, 93 L. T. (N. s.) 352 (1905)
(appraiser's certificate); National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245,
143 N. E. 833 (1924) (steel expert's certificate) ; Kahl v. Love, 37 N. 3. Law
5 (1874) (tax collector's certicate); National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U. S. 195 (1879) (lawyer's abstract of title); Gordon v. Livingston, 12 Mo.
App. 267 (1882) (grain inspector's certificate); Thomas v. Guarantee Title
& Trust Co., 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. 183 (1910) (abstract of title
certificate). But cf. Pearson v. Purkett, 15 Pick 204 (Mass. 1834).
- 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922). Cf. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix
National Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930). Directly opposed to
the instant case is Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919),
criticized in (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 234.
T' Compare statement to the same effect in the instant case, 243 N. Y.
Supp. at 182. Compare also ILl. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 110a, § 7.
32 East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181 (1913).
" As to the importance of the business to the public in the determination
of a common calling, see Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public
Calings (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 411. See also Lay, Business Policy as
Related to Accounting (1929) 4 Acc. REV. 121; Davies, The Changing
Objectives of Accounting (1929) 4 Acc. REV. 94, 106.
'4 Cf. dissent in instant case 243 N. Y. Supp. at 186; (Aug. 1930) J. OF
Ace. 87; (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 234. Title abstractors have been made
liable to third parties in some states by statute. See Note (1925) 34
A. L. R. 67.
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the judgment had been entered, the electors voted down the project. In 1927
a new resolution to take over the waterworks was approved by the electors.
The water company contested the city's right to buy at the consent judgment
price and the plaintiff brought an action to determine its rights, The lower
court dismissed the proceedings. It was held on appeal that the declaratory
form of action could not be invoked to determine the validity of a past
judgment but that the adverse vote of the electors had terminated the city's
right to take over the water plant.
Declaratory judgment proceedings are now generally favored when the
plaintiff has no other immediate remedy., There is, however, some tend-
ency, particularly noticeable in Pennsylvania, to refuse such petitions if
the plaintiff might equally well have sought other relief.2 This tendency
finds justification only when a specific statutory remedy would have
been available.3 Certainly a petition for a declaratory judgment need not
be treated as an extraordinary remedy.4 In the Zoercher case, the use of
1 Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 156, 237 N. Y.
Supp. 64 (4th Dep't 1929) ; Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 229
Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930); Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co.,
291 Pa. 507, 140 Atl. 506 (1928); see Borchard, Declaratory Judgments
(1929) 3 CIN-N. L. Ruv. 24, 27; Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 403, 407.
In this type of case, the plaintiff 'is attempting to establish the non-existence
of a jural interest claimed by the defendant, the declaration usually being
in negative form. See Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-.A Needed
Procedural Refor m . (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 1, 8, 114.
2 Appeal of Kimmell, 96 Pa. Sup. Ct. 488 (1930); Stenzel v. Kronick, 283
Pac. 93 (Cal. App. 1929); (Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263, 142 Atl. 224
(1928); Dempsey's Estate, 288 Pa. 458, 137 Ati. 170 (1927); Kaaa v.
Waiakea Mill Co., 29 Hawaii 122 (1926); Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins.
Co., 128 Misc. 232, 218 N. Y. Supp. 412 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd, 220 App. Div.
828, 224 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dep't 1927), criticized, Comment (1927)
36 YALE L. J. 403; Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144 Atl. 274 (1928). See
Taylor v. Haverford Tp., 299 Pa. 402, 406, 149 At. 639, 641 (1930); Ster-
rett's Estate, 150 Atl. 159, 162 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1930). But cf. Baumann v.
Baumann, 222 App. Div. 460, 226 N. Y. Supp. 576 (1st Dep't 1928, noted In
(1928) 38 YALnvL. J. 111; Oldham v. Moodie, 94 Cal. App. 88, 270 Pac. 688
(1928) ; Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216, 146 Atl. 571 (1929) ;
National City Bank v. Waggoner, 230 App. Div. 88, 243 N. Y. Supp. 299
(1st Dep't 1930) ; Sheldon v. Powell, 128 So. 258 (Fla. 1930) (statute pro-
viding procedure for releasing legacy held not exclusive remedy). A reason
for the tendency in Pennsylvania may be its doctrine that the declaratory
judgment should only be granted when the plaintiff can show the necessity
of a speedy determination of the issues. List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129
AtI. 64 (1925). And this necessity will not be found present it there is
other adequate remedy. See Dempsey's Estate, supra at 460, 137 At. at 171.
See N. E. Marine Eng. Co. v. Leeds Forge Co', [1906] 1 Ch. 324
(declaratory judgment refused as petition for revocation available to deter-
mine validity of patent) ; Borchard, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4, 10; Comment
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 403, 406; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 386; Lummus,
Declaratory and Interpretative Judgments in Massachusetts (1929) 14 MASS.
L. Q. 1. Although the N. Y. Civil Practice Act provides that the court has
the power to declare rights and other legal relations "whether or not fur-
ther relief is or could be claimed", the dissenting justice in National City
Bank v. Waggoner, supra. note 2, argued that since the plaintiff might have
sought coercive relief he was not entitled to a declaratory judgment.
4 Borchard, op. cit. supra note 1, at 114 n. 175. But cf. Sheldon v. Powell,
supra, note 2.
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any of the alternative procedures available to the plaintiffs S might have in-
volved a relative degree of "disturbance and unrest" and a needless expendi-
ture of time and money, to no added advantage. And in the Williamsport
case, had the plaintiff been compelled to institute an action for specific per-
formance, or for execution of the old judgment, the very spirit and purpose
of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act would have been frustrated.G
In fact, the court virtually declared the rights of the petitioners, although
it gave no convincing reason for its refusal to issue a formal declaratory
judgment.7 Perhaps the reactionary attitude on the part of the formerly
liberal Pennsylvania court may be traced to an unwarranted fear of over-
burdening the judiciary.8
AIR LAW-INvASION OF AIR SPACE ABOVE PRIVATELY OWNED LAND AS
TRESPASS.-The defendant had constructed an airport some fourteen miles
from the city of Cleveland in a locality which, although sparsely settled,
was devoted entirely to farming and residential purposes. The plaintiff,
owner of a 135 acre estate adjoining the defendant's premises, applied
for an injunction against the operation of the airport as a nuisance and
against the repeated flights over his land as trespasses. The court denied
the injunction against the operation of the airport and held that flights
above the minimum 500 feet set by the Federal Air Commerce Regulations
pursuant to the Air Commerce Act of 1926 2 were not trespasses. Injunc-
tions" were granted against unnecessary raising of dust, dropping of
circulars, and all flights below 500 feet even when made in taking off or
landing. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F. (2d) 929 (N. D.
Ohio 1930).
The question of unconstitutionality might have been raised as a defense
against enforcement proceedings, by application for an injunction, or in a
suit to recover payments made under protest.
6See UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT, § 12; cf. Sunderland, A
Modern Evolutioi In Remedial Rights-The Declaratory Judgment (1917)
16 MICH. L. Rm. 69, 76; Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131
At. 265, 271 (1927); Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 480, 261 S. W. 965,
970 (1924); Sheldon v. Powell, supra note 2, at 262.
7The court assigns no other reason for its decision that the Declaratory
Judgment Act cannot be used to elucidate judgments than that it cannot
be used to elucidate judicial decrees, and cites Ladner v. Siegel, supra note
2, -where on a totally dissimilar state of facts the court says at 375,
144 Atl. at 276: "Construction of a decree cannot be given until the
question comes regularly before the court in proceedings requiring
construction and application to acts alleged to have been done or omitted
under it." But cf. Back's Guardian v. Bardo, 234 Ky. 211, 27 S. W. (2d)
960 (1930).
S Total digested number of petitions for declaratory judgments in the
Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Courts were: 1916-1927, 5; 1924, 4;
1928, 8 (after the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act had been found
constitutional) ; 1929, 5; 1930 (Jan-July), 11. For further evidence as to
the possibility of the Declaratory Judgment "overburdening" the judiciary,
compare REP. TO COMI. ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (July, 1929, unpublished)
question 4.
'Am TR.AFFic RuLEs § 74(g).
2AIR COMMllERCE ACT, 44 STAT. 2119 (1926), 49 U. S. C. A. § 171 (Supp.
1929). The instant court held that the state statute, Laws of Ohio (1929)
No. 96, p. 28, while itself setting no minimum altitude, expressed the intent
to adopt the federal regulations.
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The court in the instant case definitely affirms the opinion of legal
writers,3 the statements of lower courts in this country,4 and decisions of
European courts 5 that a landowner's sovereignty in the air space is subject
to a right of flight.0 It has been said that such a judicial determination
of the point was necessary to free aerial navigation from the taint of
technical illegality.7 Prior to the era of flying, the maxim cujus est solumn
ejus est usque ad coelum s prevailed both in the common 9 and civil 10 law
as a convenient legal formula to protect the landowner from permanent
obstructions above the surface."l When flying became a fact, however, the
absurdity of a literal application of the maxim was apparent.12 And as the
adjustment of the rights of aviators and landowners became necessary,
regulatory statutes were passed clearly based on the assumption that the
landowner has no sovereignty above what is necessary for the enjoyment
of the surface.13 These statutes may perhaps be interpreted and justified
as an exercise of the police power.14 But the instant decision appears
to rest on a denial of the literal truth of the ancient maxim, and a conse-
quent contention that Section 10 a5 of the Air Commerce Act did not seek
3 PoLL oK, LAW op TORTS (13th ed. 1929) 361; ZOLLMAN, LAW OF THE Ain
(1930) c. 1; DAVIS, AERONAUTICAL LAw (1930) c. 2; Bogert, Problems in
Aviation Law (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 271, 293.
t See Johnson v. Curtiss N. W. Airplane Co., [1928] U. S. Av. Rep. 42
(D. C. Minn. 1923); Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith, 2 Pa. D. & 0. 241,
[1928] U. S. Av. Rep. 39 (1922); ZOLLMAN, CASES ON Ant LAW (1930)
1-11.
5 See LOGAN, AIRCRAFT LAW MADE PLAIN (1928) 16.
G See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. Inc., 170 N. E. 385 (Mass.
1930). Here the facts and judgment of the court resembled the instant
case, but the issue was limited by the pleadings to flight over the plaintiff's
property at 100 feet; this was held a trespass but was not enjoined. See
also (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 579; (1930) U. OF PA. L. REV. 902; Note (1930)
1 Am L. REv. 272.
7 ZOLLMIAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 26.
8 For the supposed origin and history of this maxim see Bouv6, Privato
Ownership of Airspace (1930) 1 Am L. REV. 232; Kuhn, The Beginnings of
an Aerial Law (1910) 4 Am. J. INT. LAw 109.
0 Co. LrrT. § 4a; 1 BL. Comm. 733.
0 FRENCH CIVIL CODE, art. 552, par. 1; GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Loewy's
translation) § 905 and note.
"1 See Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 945 for list of cases. See also DAVIS, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 33 et seq.
12 ZOLLMAN, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 15; HAZELTINE, THE LAw OF TiE
Am (1911) 74; REP. OF HOUSE CoM. ON Am COMM=ERC ACT OF 1926, H. R.
572, March 17, 1926, at 13; REP. OF BRIT. AERIAL TRANSPORT COM. (1918)
146 L. T. 105; Bouv6, op. cit. supra note 8, at 249. But cf. Hines (of
plaintiff's counsel in the instant case), Home vs. Aeroplane (1930) 16 A. B.
A. J. 217.
23 See, in addition to FEDERAL AIR. COMMERCE ACT, supra. note 2, BRITIShI
AIR NAVIGATION ACT, 10 & 11 GEO. V. c. 80 (1920); FRENCH and GERMAN
CODES, supra note 10; UNIFORM STATE LAW FOR AERONAUTICS (adopted by
twenty states and Hawaii) § 4; Freeman, Survey of State Aeronautical
Legislation (1930) 1 Am L. REV. 61.
-4 See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co. supra note 6, at 391.
15 This section declares the air space above the minimum safe altitudes of
flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce to be navigable and subject
to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign commerce.
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to "create" but merely to enact the right of flight as it existed at common
law.16 Accordingly the minimum height regulation, by setting an arbitrary
limit to this freedom of navigation, is seen as a protection rather than a
curtailment of the landowner's property rights. Since, however, flight
below 500 feet in taking off and landing is specifically excepted from the
minimum height restriction by the Air Traffic Rules, the landowner's pro-
tection from such flights must be derived solely from his common law
right. The court makes it clear that this right amounts only to a freedom
from interference with effective possession of the surface, and that a
reasonable altitude in taking off and landing, although here set at 500 feet,
must vary with the circumstances. A similar principle, it is believed, must
control all such flying as is not subject to the Federal regulations in
those jurisdictions where no minimum height is set by statute.1 - Whether
in such jurisdictions damage resulting from the noise of a plane, as for
example, the frightening of stock, would be prima facie evidence of un-
reasonably low flying remains to be adjudicated. The instant decision
presents a commendably flexible basis for the solution of the more difficult
air problems that must arise when it becomes necessary to establish air-
ports nearer to, or perhaps within, city limits.
BANKS AND BANKING-EFFECT ON HOLDER iN DUE COURSE OF DIsHoNOn
OF CERTIFIED CnucK.-The plaintiff banks were induced by forged tele-
grams sent by Waggoner, the President of the Telluride Bank, but purport-
ing to come from the plaintiffs' correspondent, to pay $500,000 to the Chase
National Bank to the credit of the Telluride Bank. On the same day
Waggoner demanded payment at the Chase Bank of a check which had
been signed in blank by the cashier of the Telluride Bank and which
Waggoner had filled in as to amount and made payable to himself in the
presence of the Chase Bank. When payment was refused, Waggoner in-
dorsed the check in blank and took it to the defendant bank which refused
to cash it but credited it to the account of the Telluride Bank, then indebted
to the defendant on past due notes. On the next business day the defendant
had the check certified by the Chase Bank and then specifically applied it
to the payment of the notes. The following day the check was cleared but
before 3 P.M., in accordance with the rules of the Clearing House, the
Chase Bank notified the defendant of the fraud and demanded credit for
the amount of the check, which was refused. Subsequently the Telluride
Bank was declared insolvent. The plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the
form of an accounting against the defendant as constructive trustee. They
alleged that when the defendant received the check it had knowledge "as
to the manner in which the check had been issued" and that at or prior to
certification the defendant knew that the Telluride Bank was insolvent and
"did not own such a large amount of money." The court denied the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the complaint and on appeal the order was affirmed,
two judges dissenting. National City Bantk of New York v. Waggoncr"
(Central Hanover Trust Company irnpleaded), 243 N. Y. Supp. 299 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1930).
Under the construction placed by the majority of the instant court upon
'16 See principal case at 934 and 938. See also Logan, The Nature of the
Right of Flight (1930) 1 Am L. Rnv. 94. But of. Marshall, Some Legal
Problems of the Aeronaut (1923) 6 ILL. L. Q. 50, 57.
17 As to whether intrastate commercial flight is within the province of
the Federal regulations, see Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35
F. (2d) 761 (N. D. Ohio 1929); Newman, Aviation Law and the Constitu-
tion (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1113.
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the plaintiffs' allegations as to knowledge, the defendant could not have
been a holder in due course inasmuch as it definitely knew of the fraudulent
scheme when it received the checks.' Subsequent certification by the
drawee could thus have had no effect, since even after certifying a check the
drawee may cancel certification or recover payment made under it from a
holder who had acted in bad faith at the time he took the instrument.2 But,
according to the dissenting members of the court the allegation concerning
the defendant's knowledge at the time it received the check was insufficient
to charge the defendant with constructive notice of the fraud prior to
certification, and hence the defendant was then a holder in good faith.3 Nor,
the minority asserted, were the allegations sufficient to charge constructive
notice at the time of certification because the certification, which would
have contradicted any suspicions that might otherwise have put the defend-
ant on inquiry, was also alleged. Finally, granting this interpretation
of the complaint, any notice received by the defendant after certification
would have been immaterial, since the defendant was then a holder in good
faith and even for value in that it held past due notes frohi the depositor
when it received the check for credit.4 This interpretation, however, seems
to disregard the New York rule that certification by the drawee does not
prevent recovery even from a holder in due course if the check has been
certified by mistake, provided the holder's position has not been altered
to his injury and the rights of third parties have not intervened. Further-
more it would seem that it would be the proceeds of the check upon their
receipt rather than the check itself which would be applied to the satisfac-
tion of the past due notes. Yet it is conceded that the defendants knew of
the fraud before the receipt of the proceeds had been completed under the
Clearing House rules, so the defendant could not be considered a holder for
value. Hence the conclusion reached by the majority of the court as to the
sufficiency of the allegations would appear sound even though a construc-
tion of the complaint be adopted which accords with the views of the
dissenting judges.
1 National City Bank of Seattle v. Titlow, 233 Fed. 838 (W. D. Wash.
1916) ; American National Bank v. Kerley, 109 Ore. 156, 220 Pac. 116
(1923), 32 A. L. R. 262 (1924).
2 Wilson v. Mid-West State Bank, 193 Iowa 311, 186 N. W. 891, 21
A. L. R. 229 (1922); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Baker, 60 N. J. Eq. 170, 47 Atl.
6 (1900).
3 State v. Emery, 73 Okla. 36, 174 Pac. 770 (1918), 6 A. L, R. 234 (1920);
N. Y. NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (Cahill, 1923) § 95.
4 American Surety Co. v. Palmer, 240 N. Y. 63, 147 N. E. 359 (1925);
N. Y. NEGOTBLmE INSTRUMENTS LAW (Cahill, 1923) § 51; of. Colorado
National Bank v. Western Grain Co., 118 So. 588 (Ala. 1928); (1929) 77
U. OF PA. L. RE#. 690. See Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y.
487, 495, 89 N. E. 1082, 1085 (1909).
5 National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exchange Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157
N. Y. Supp. 316 (1st Dep't 1916); Mt. Morris Bank v. 23rd Ward Bank,
172 N. Y. 244, 64 N. E. 810 (1902). But cf. Riverside Bank v. First Na-
tional Bank of Shenandoah, 74 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896); National Bank
of Commerce v. Baltimore Commercial Bank, 141 Md. 554, 118 At]. 855
(1922). See note (1924) 29 A. L. R. 140; Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV.
631; (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 733.
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CONDITIONAL SALES-EFFECT OP CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF VENDEE
AUTOMOBILE DRIVER UPON RECOVERY BY CONDITIONAL VENDOR.-The plain-
tiff, the assignee of a conditional vendor of a motor car, after default by
the vendee sued the defendant, a third party, to recover for damages to
the car resulting from a collision in which both the defendant and the
vendee were negligent. The trial court held, inter alia, that the vendee's
contributory negligence precluded recovery by the plaintiff. Upon appeal
the judgment was reversed on the ground that by the terms of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act conditional sales were to be classed as bailments,
and that the negligence of the vendee was therefore not to be imputed to
the plaintiff. Co'mmercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaitc, 150 Atl. 235
(N. J. 1930).
The instant court makes its decision automatic by arbitrarily labelling
the transaction involved a bailment, rather than attempting a factual
analogy to other methods of credit extension. Under these it has been
uniformly held that the creditor, whether conditional vendor,' chattel mort-
gageer or land mortgagee,3 has a valid right of action against a third
party, similar to that of the debtor 4 for damage to the subject matter of
the credit transaction, caused by the negligence of the third party. Although
it is said that the actions of creditor and debtor are separate and inde-
pendent,5 in certain situations the acts of one will effect the other's right
of action. Thus, recovery by either against the negligent third party will
bar recovery by the other,6 and a compromise by one party has likewise
affected the other's right to sue.7 It has even been held that when the
possessor of a chattel so uses it as to render it subject to confiscation,
such confiscation will be effective against the innocent "title holder." 8 The
instant court might have found in this line of cases sufficient precedent as
to debtor-creditor interdependence to warrant an imputation of the vendee's
iRyals v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 158 Ga. 303, 123 S. E. 12 (1924);
United Iron Works v. Hurley Mason Co., 71 Wash. 275, 128 Pac. 209
(1912); cf. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Miller, 209 Ala. 378, 96 So. 322 (1923).
2 Carter v. Haynes, 269 S. W. 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Wylie v. Ohio,
etc. R. R., 48 S. C. 405, 26 S. E. 676 (1897).
3 Burrill National Bank v. Edminster, 119 Me. 367, 111 Atl. 423 (1920);
Gooding v. Shea, 103 Mass. 360 (1869).
4 (a) Conditional vendee: Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Duncan, 16
Ala. App. 520, 79 So. 513 (1918); Stotts v. Puget Sound Traction, Light,
& Power Co., 94 Wash. 339, 162 Pac. 519 (1917), L. B. A. 1917D, 214;
cf. Peterson v. Chess, 92 Wash. 682, 159 Pac. 894 (1916) (vendor had
retaken possession). (b) Chattel mortgagor: Gover v. Central Vermont
Ry., 96 Vt. 208, 118 Atl. 874 (1922); Wilkes v. Southern Ry., 85 S. C. 346,
67 S. E. 292 (1910), 21 Ann. Cas. 79 (1911). (c) Land mortgagor: Logan
v. Wabash Western Ry., 43 Mo. App. 71 (1890); Van Dyke v. Grand Trunk
Ry., 84 Vt. 212, 78 Atl. 958 (1911), Ann. Cas. 1913A 640.
5 Gooding v. Shea, supra note 3, at 363.
6 Lord, Stone & Co. v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320, 37 Atl. 1048 (1897). See
Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. v. Unaka Springs Lumber Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 381,
170 S. W. 591, 598 (1914).
7 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. v. Earl, 121 Ark. 514, 181 S. W.
925 (1916); Harris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319
(1925). But cf. French v. Osmer, 67 Vt. 427, 32 At. 254 (1895).
8 Pennington v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 803, 102 S. E. 758 (1920) (con-
fiscation allowed). This is apparently the minority view. Cf. Flint Motor
Car Co. v. State, 204 Ala. 437, 85 So. 741 (1920) ; State v. Davis, 55 Utah
54, 184 Pac. 161 (1919). And see (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 91.
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negligenc6 to the vendor. It is true that such a holding would have opposed
the dictum of the only other court which has considered the identical
problem.9 Yet, by refusing a defendant an otherwise available defense in
order to protect a vendor engaged in the business of instalment selling,
the instant court shifts what appears to be a legitimate risk of the vendor's
business to third parties, who will be forced to pay either damages or
higher liability insurance rates1 0
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW-INCOBIIE TAX ON ROYALTIES FOR THE USE OF COPY-
RIGHTS-The State of Wisconsin levied a tax upon certain income of an
author derived from contracts with publishing houses. Under these con-
tracts the author received compensation for the assignment to the publisher
of his right to secure copyrights and for the assignment of copyrights
already secured. The author contended that the state tax on income de-
rived from copyright royalties was invalid, as a tax on a federal instru-
mentality. On appeal, the Tax Commission ruled that the state could levy
the tax in question since the income taxed was not royalty but gain accruing
to the author as "the result of his investment of his labor." Appcal of
Ross, U, S. Daily Sept. 2, 1930, at 7.
The principle that the states cannot tax federal instrumentalities 1 was
greatly extended when the Supreme Court of the United States held invalid
a state tax upon income derived by a lessee from the sale of oil and gas
received under leases of Indian lands.2  More recently the same court
held invalid the levying of a similar tax upon income derived from royalties
for the use of patents.3 The patentee in that case retained the patent
rights in his own name, merely licensing the use of the patents by a manu-
facturing company. The Tax Commission distinguished the instant case
from the patent case by declaring that the tax in question was on the income
accruing to the author under his contracts with the publishing companies,
rather than from the copyrights,4 which, by the contracts, became the
property of the publishers. By such a legalistic device the Commission
avoided a further extension of the already over-worked doctrine of federal
instrumentalities. The copyright laws, in securing to authors the exclusive
right to their writings for the statutory period," fully satisfy the con-
stitutional provision aimed to encourage literary effort.0 To grant the
further encouragement sought in the instant case would discriminate un-
fairly in the author's favor as against those who earn their income by less
exalted means. Furthermore, it is difficult to regard the tax in question as
9 See Lacey v. Great Northern R. R., 70 Mont. 346, 354, 225 Pac. 808,
811 (1924), 38 A. L. R. 1331, 1337 (1925).
10 See LECTURES ON INSURANCE (Insurance Society of N. Y., 1922) 03.
I See 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 606.
2 Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1922) (per Holmes,
J.-The Oil Company is "an instrumentality used by the United States in
carrying out [its] duties to the Indians"). This decision was largely based
on Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 36
Sup. Ct. 453 (1916) (state tax on value of an Indian oil lease invalid).
3 Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463 (1928), aff'g 257 Mass.
572, 154 N. E. 182; see (1927) 26 MICH. L. REv. 120. But see (1928)
28 COL. L. R.V. 1100.
4 A similar argument was used to no avail by the Commissioner of Taxa-
tion in Long v. Rockwood,,supra note 3, Petitioner's Brief, p. 33.
5 See 35 STAT. 1080 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. (1927) §§ 23, 24.
6 Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, § 8.
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a serious impairment of the operation of the federal government such as
the federal instrumentalities doctrine was designed to eliminate.-
CONxTRAcTs-IIPLIED AGREEMENT TO BEAR EQUALLY PREMIUMI COSTS OF
JOINT L= INSURANCE PoLiCY.Two brothers took out a joint life insurance
policy payable to the survivor. At the end of six years, during which period
premium costs were borne equally, one brother refused to continue his share
of the payments; the other, to keep the policy alive, continued to pay the
full amount. Upon the death of the defaulter, the survivor collected the
proceeds and sued the deceased's estate to recover one half of the premium
costs. The lower court held for the claimant on the ground that the facts
gave rise to an implied contract to share the premium costs equally, and on
appeal the decision was affirmed. In re Montgomcry's Estate, 299 Pa. 452,
149 Atl. 705 (1930).
In the clear absence of an express contract, the instant court could have
allowed recovery only upon the theory of a contract implied in fact or a
quasi-contract.' Contracts implied in fact are said to differ from express
contracts only in the method of proof 2 and to arise under circumstances
which show a mutual intent to contract.3 While such contracts have been
implied principally in eases of services performed,' money loaned at re-
quest,5 and the like, they may also arise wherever the "circumstances de-
mand the conclusion of a contract to account for them." 0 The facts of the
instant case, however, would not seem to compel the implication of a con-
tract.7 Furthermore, since the equitable doctrine of contribution is gener-
ally limited to eases of joint obligations,s and since, the present policy
being unilateral,9 there was no obligation to pay the premiums, it is diffi-
cult to find authority by which the court could have imposed upon the de-
faulter a quasi-contractual duty to contribute.20 Likewise, where a policy
beneficiary has been held to a quasi-contractual duty of restitution to one
-who has voluntarily advanced the premiums, it has been on the recognized
7 See COOLY, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 606; GRAY, LnmrrATIONS OF TAX-
ING POWER (1906) § 753.
'On the difficulty of distinction between these two, see Kellum v. Brown-
ing's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S. W. (2d) 459 (1929); Highway Commis-
sioners v. Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 170, 97 N. E. 280, 284 (1912); 3 PAGE,
C NTRACTS (2 ed. 1920, Supp. 1929) c. 13, 14; ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's
ed. 1919) 543; KEENER, QuASI-CoNTRAcTs (1893) C. 1.
2 See Raymond v. Sheldon's Estate, 92 Vt. 396, 397, 104 Atl. 106, 107
(1918).
3 See Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 468 (1857).
4 Cf. Collins v. Lewis, 1.11 Conn. 299, 149 Atl. 668 (1930). See also
Reitmyer v. Coxe Bros. & Co., 264 Pa. 372, 107 AtI. 739 (1919).
5 Cf. Couts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686, 96 Pac. 357 (1908).
6 See Hertzog v. Hertzog, supra note 3, at 469.
7 Cf. Robinson v. Hayes' Estate, 207 App. Div. 718, 202 N. Y. Supp. 732
(3d Dep't 1924) ; Butler v. Peters, 62 Mont. 381, 205 Pac. 247 (1922), 26
A. L. R. 560 (1923).
s Exchange Mutual Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Zurich General Accident, Fire
and Life Ins. Co., 122 Misc. 386, 202 N. Y. Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct 1924);
Andrews v. Murray, 33 Barb. 354 (N. Y. 1861);. 2 ELLIOTT, CONTRACTS
(1913) 760, (1923 Supp.) 360.
9 Cf. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 260.
10 See the valuable discussion of quasi-contractual obligations in KEENER,
op. cit. supra, note 1.
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equitable principle of preventing "unjust enrichment." 11 Although there
appears no technical "unjust enrichment" in the present situation, neverthe-
less, by virtue of the claimant's payment of the full premium rates,12 the
deceased, until his death, had actually received the full benefit as an expect-
ant, conditional beneficiary. Accordingly it seems probable that the court
was influenced in finding an implied contract as a basis for recovery rather
by the equities of the case than by any established legal justification.
CORPORATE TRUSTEES-RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN CERTIFYING
BONDS.-An automobile finance corporation issued bonds under a trust
indenture, each bond being certified by the defendant bank as trustee as
one of a series described in the indenture. The indenture recited that the
trustee should authenticate the bonds, "provided, however, there shall be
delivered and pledged with the trustee" as collateral security the "notes
of dealers, of purchasers of motor vehicles, or other first lien mortgages."
The indenture also contained an esculpatory clause to the effect that receipt
by the trustee of an affidavit from the president of the corporation vouching
for the collateral security would afford full protection for all action taken
on the faith thereof. Without receiving affidavits as to the character of
the security deposited, the trustee authenticated the bonds. Upon the bank-
ruptcy of the finance corporation it was discovered that the security posted
with the trustee failed to conform to the requirements of the indenture and
was valueless. In a suit by a bondholder to recover from the trustee the
amount paid for the bonds, the New York Court of Appeals, reversing the
lower court, held that since the defendant had not received any affidavit
as to the character of the collateral, the plaintiff might recover for the
defendant's negligence in accepting security which did not conform to that
required by the indenture. Doyle v. Chatham Phenix Bank, 171 N. E. 574
(N. Y. 1930).
By the authentication of a bond the trustee under a corporate indenture
certifies only that the bond- is genuine and that it is within the number
authorized by the trust indenture.' Under such a certification attempts
to extend the responsibility of the trustee to an implied guaranty of the
sufficiency of the security have uniformly failed.2 But where the indenture
provides, as in the instant case, for authentication only upon certain con-
ditions, the trustee is usually held responsible for the accurate fulfillment
". Stockwell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 Cal. 198, 73 Pac. 833 (1903)
(one of five contingent beneficiaries paid the premiums on the default of
the assured; he was allowed to recover the advancements from the other
beneficiaries who claimed their interest in the proceeds); Morgan v. Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co., 132 App. Div. 455, 116 *N. Y. Supp. 989 (4th Dep't
1909), aff'd, 197 N. Y. 607, 91 N. E. 1117 (1910) (assignee of policy under
void assignment who paid the premiums given an equitable lien on the
proceeds to secure his advances) ; 2 JOYCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) 1862;
1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) 676.
12 For comparison of joint and ordinary life rates see HUEBNER, LIFE
INSURANCE (1925) 118.
1 Tschetinian v. City' Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 432, 79 N. E. 401 (1906);
McCauley v. Ridgewood Trust Co., 81 N. J. L. 86, 79 Atl, 327 (1911) ; JONES,
CORPORATE BONDS & MORTGAGES (1907) § 287a.
2 Byers v. Trust Co., 175 Pa. 318, 34 Atl. 629 (1896) (mortgage a
second mortgage); Bauernschmidt v. Maryland Trust Co., 89 Md. 507,
43 Atl. 790 (1899) (security inadequate); Bell v. Title Trust & Guarantee
Co., 292 Pa. 228, 140 Atl. 900 (1928) (unrecorded mortgage).
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of such conditions. 3 Owing to the use of trust terminology, however, and
to the peculiar situation of the corporate trustee midway between a stake-
holder and an ordinary trustee, courts have been troubled to find a basis
for such responsibility.4 One theory advanced is that the right of the
bondholders rests upon a breach of an implied duty owed by the defendant
trustee to the bondholders as eestuis.5 It has also been suggested that the
trustee may be held responsible in tort for deceit.0 The instant case
expressly repudiates the "trust" theory on the ground that no trust
relationship existed at the time of the "unauthorized act." Likewise it
disposes of the "deceit" theory for the reason that intentional fraud, which
is absent in the principal case, is an essential element of such an action.
But having determined that the action of the defendant was "unauthorized"
according to the terms of the indenture, the court proceeded to hold it
responsible in tort for negligent misrepresentation. The grounding of the
decision upon a general theory of negligence, however, raises the possibility
of an extension of a corporate trustee's duties beyond those intentionally
assumed under the terms of the indenture.7 Unless the relationship of the
parties makes it advisable to impose upon the trustee a broad duty of
due care, it -would seem preferable to have predicated liability upon a
breach of an implied contract 8 between the trustee and the bondholders, or
between the trustee and the corporation for the benefit of the bondholders.9
GARNISHB1ENT-PROTECTION OF GARNISHEE AGAINST DOUBEB LLEnBiaTy o.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT-The plaintiffs as creditors of the principal debtor, a
citizen of Haiti, obtained judgments in both Haiti and Connecticut for
money due on business done in Haiti. Garnishee process was served on the
defendant insurance company in both places for money due to the assignee
in bankruptty of the principal debtor on a fire insurance policy. In the
Connecticut action the plaintiffs entered a demurrer to a plea of double
liability based upon the defendant's absolute liability for the debt in Haiti.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut overruled the demurrer and held for the
defendant. Parker, Peebles & Kvo:x a. National Fire Ins. Co., 150 AtI.
313 (Conn. 1930).
3 Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 102 Atl. 844 (1918),
aff'd, 89 N. J. Eq. 584, 1,06 Atl. 890 (1918). Cf. Rhinelander v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499 (1902) (non-delivery by
corporation of required affidavits).
4 See Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the Corporate Indenture
(1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 198, 200.
5 Rhinelander v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra note 3; Conover v.
Guarantee Trust Co., supra, note 3.
6 Mullen v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 108 Die. 498, 81 Atl. 948 (1911)
(over-issue of bonds).
7 See Green v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 10, 227
N. Y. Supp. 252, 257 (1st Dep't 1928); Harvey v. Guarantee Trust Co., 134
Misc. 417, 425, 236 N. Y. Supp. 37, 51 (Sup. Ct. 1929); of. Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 243 N. Y. Supp. 179 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1930), noted
(1930) 40 YALE L. J. 128.
8 Cf. Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 863, 129 N. Y.
Supp. 807 (3d Dep't 1911); See Rhinelander v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
supra, note 3, at 538, 65 N. E. at 505.
9 The relation of debtor-creditor between the corporation as promisee and
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It is generally agreed that the garnishee should not be placed in any
worse position by the garnishment than he occupied as the debtor of his
creditor.1 Thus Chancellor Kent early held that a garnishee might plead
a judgment of any state or English Colony against himself as garnishee
in bar to a claim by the principal debtor to the original debt.2 In the
United States, however, the variance in state laws as to the situs of a
debt13 often subjected a garnishee to a risk of double liability.4  The
United States Supreme Court, recognizing through the fiction rnobilia
sequuntur personam that a debt may be transitory, later required a state to
give full faith and credit to a judgment of garnishment in another state.5
But as foreign powers are not required to recognize garnishee orders,
since they are discretionary and governed by the lex fori, there may arise
another risk of double liability.6 The English courts refuse to grant a
garnishee order if there is a risk of liability to a second judgment properly
recoverable in a foreign nation,7 though by a recent decision the rule is
limited to situations where the risk of double liability is real and not specu-
latives The Supreme Court of Arizona inaugurated this doctrine in this
country in a situation similar to the present case 0 and it has been approved
by an eminent text-writer in the field of conflict of laws.10 Considered In the
light of the desirability of encouraging our increasingly important
foreign business, the present decision is a highly acceptable and far-reaching
precedent. It protects domestic banking and insurance companies engaged
in business in foreign countries from deliberate muleting by warring liti-
gants and at the same time only forces the plaintiffs to pursue their
remedies where properly recoverable. Furthermore, it prevents the garnisher
from securing an unwarranted preference over the creditors of the bank-
rupt debtor.
the bondholders as beneficiaries would seem to be sufficient even in New
York to support such a contract. Cf. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
2 Lancashire v. Corbetts, 165 Ill. 592, 46 N. E. 631 (1897). See National
Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468, 491, 32 AtI. 663, 672 (1895);
2 SHINN, ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT (1896) § 707.
2 Embree & Collins v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 101 (N. Y. 1809).
3 Note (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 605, 607.
4 See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 128.
Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625 (1905); Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct. 797 (1899). The
courts have readily used this principle to cover differences in state garnish-
ment statutes with respect to service of process and exemption laws.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Hostetter, 240 U. S. 620, 36 Sup. Ct. 475 (1916);
Williams v. St. Louis & S. W. Ry., 109 La. 90, 33 So. 94 (1902). The
danger of double liability in different states is now the same as in a single
state, where only the garnishee's negligence and fraud in not properly
protecting the rights of the principal debtor exposes him to such a danger.
Bayer v. Lovelace, 204 Mass. 327, 90 N. E. 538 (1910); SHINN, op. cit.
supra note 1, at §§ 708, 714, 717, 718, 719, 720.
6 Martin v. Nadel, [1906] 2 K. B. 26.
7 Ibid.; of. Sea Ins. Co. v. Russia Ins. Co. of Petrograd, 20 Ll. L. R. 308
(1924).
8 See Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Sedgwick, Collins & Co.,
[1927] A. C. 95, 112.
9 Weitzeil v. Weitzeil, 27 Ariz. 117, 230 Pac. 1106 (1924).
10 GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 130.
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MORTGAGES-POWER OF MORTGAGEE TO ACCELERATE DEBT UPOx ACCIDENTAL
INTEREST DEFAuLT.-The plaintiff held a $335,000 ten-year mortgage on
which the defendant corporation was owner of the equity of redemption.
Interest, due quarterly, had been regularly paid on a diminishing
principal for a period of two years. An acceleration clause provided that
upon a twenty-day default in any interest instalment, the whole principal
sum would become due at the option of the mortgagee. On June 2, the
defendant's president, who had sole authority to do so, signed two chccl:s
for the instalmetit due July 1, the amount having been computed by his
secretary. The following day he left on a hurried business trip to Europe.
Upon receipt of notice from the mortgagee dated June 24, stating the
amount of the coming interest payment to be $4621.56, the secretary re-
figured the interest and found an error of $401.87 in her previous compu-
tation. On the 30th she mailed the two checks, promising to send the
balance on the president's return. The mortgagee accepted and deposited
the checks. The secretary "completely forgot" to inform her employer of
her error upon his return July 5. On the 22d, no demand for the unpaid
balance having been made, service of sunmons and complaint to foreclose
the mortgage apprised the president for the first time of his delinquency.
Tender of the interest in default plus expenses and costs was refused.
In a four to three decision, reversing the Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division, the New York Court of Appeals granted foreclosure on the
ground that "the interests of certainty and security in real estate trans-
actions" require the enforcement of a covenant fair on its face, in the
absence of fraud, bad faith or unconscionable conduct Graf v. Hope Bldg.
Corp., 254 N. Y. 1, 171 N. E. 884 (1930).
It is ordinarily unnecessary to give notice of election to accelerate before
bringing suit,' except in Wisconsin-! and North Dakota.3 Tender of the
amount in default prior to any communication from the mortgagee electing
to exercise his option will usually prevent acceleration." But generally
commencement of the action is regarded as a sufficient communication to
render ineffective any tender of arrears of interest subsequent to service
of summons and complaint.5 In the instant case, the dissenting opinion,
' Bank of Commerce v. Scofield, 126 Cal. 156, 58 Pac. 451 (1899) (suit
one month after default); Collins v. Nagel, 200 Iowa 562, 203 N. W. 702
(1925) (three months).
2 Basse v. Galeger, 7 Wis. 442 (1859) (two months). But a stipulation
waiving notice is valid. Grootemaat v. Bertrand, 192 Wis. 519, 213 N. W.
294 (1927) (suit 40 days after default without prior notice).
3 N. D. Co.Ai. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1926) § 8099a. The mortgagor is
empowered to prevent acceleration by payment within the 30-day statutory
notice period. But see State Bank v. First National Bank, 49 N. D. 611,
192 N. W. 967 (1923).
4 Weinberg v. Naher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 Pac. 736 (1909) (tender 20 days
after default and two days prior to suit); Trinity County Bank v. Haas,
151 Cal. 553, 91 Pac. 385 (1907) (tender three months after default and
six days prior to suit). Ccnra: Swearingen v. Lahner, 93 Iowa 147, 61
N. W. 431 (1894) (tender six months after default and three weeks prior
to suit).
5 Ferris v. Ferris, 28 Barb. 29 (N. Y. 1858); Crawford v. Houser, 115
Neb. 62, 211 N. W. 165 (1926) ; Brown v. Kennedy, 309 31o. 335, 274 S. W.
357 (1925) (mortgagor fails to enjoin sale where tender made 17 days
after published notice thereof); Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 732. But ef.
UNIFORM RL ESTATE MORTGAGE ACT (1927) § 10, providing that fore-
closure for principal shall cease upon tender of amount in default with costs.
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although expressly recognizing the foregoing general rule, contends that
the mortgagee's knowledgeof the accidental character of the defendant's
partial default followed by a hasty attempt to foreclose without first
demanding the unpaid interest, brought his behavior within the category
of "unconscionable" conduct. Where default has been positively induced
by the mortgagee's misconduct the courts have regularly refused accelora.
tion.6 The state of mind of the defaulting mortgagor in itself has seldom
been considered material The instant case raises the more difficult ques-
tion whether the epithet "unconscionable" is applicable tb the conduct of
a mortgagee who seeks to benefit from a default fostered by mere inaction
coupled with an awareness of the mortgagor's good intentions.8
The absence of harm to the mortgagee in this particular case enables
the dissent to strengthen its position by a close analogy drawn from the
frequent refusal to accelerate the mortgage debt on the ground of failure
to pay taxes in cases where the overdue taxes were paid subsequent to
suit but prior to sale of the mortgaged premises.9 The dissent recognizes,
however, the difference in the nature of the creditor's need with respect
to the prompt payment of interest. And were the courts to weaken sub-
stantially the compulsion inherent in the mortgagee's power to accelerate
a large debt several years by relieving the mortgagor from the full conse-
quences of an ordinary interest default upon payment subsequent to election
by notice or suit, debtors could neglect such obligations with impunity and
thus practically defeat the purpose of the acceleration clause. If a decision
for the defendant would lead to such a result the position of the majority
is amply justified. The possibility of increased litigation, created by any
departure from the strict rule making the intention of the mortgagor
irrelevant, lends further support to that position. But in encouraging the
use of the acceleration clause beyond its principal purpose of insuring
prompt payments of interest, the effect may be to assist the fly-by-night
mortgagee in obtaining a speculative profit in a rising money market or a
bonus from a reinvestment whenever a technical slip by the mortgagor
brings him within the penalty of his verbal bargain. Thus, it is as likely
that the decision will offer an increased opportunity for speculation as
that it will contribute to business stability.o But after all the wisest guess
as to the consequences of the decision is perhaps that implicit in the position
of the minority that the only issue was the doing of justice in the particular
case.
aNoyes v. Clark, 7 Paige 179 (N. Y. 1838); DeGroot v. MceCottor, 19
N. J. Eq. 531 (1868).
7 Warwick Iron Co. v. Morton, 148 Pa. St. 72, 23 Atl. 1065 (1892) ; Spring
v. Fisk, 21 N. J. Eq. 175 (1870); Pizer v. Herzig, 120 App. Div. 102, 105
N. Y. Supp, 38 (1st Dep't 1907); Ferris v. Ferris, supra note 5.
3 Cf. Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436, 138 Atl. 433 (1927) (mort-
gagee, bringing suit without demand or notice on day following expiration
of grace period, denied foreclosure on ground of unconscionable conduct and
hardship to defendant even though total default in first interest payment
was occasioned by mortgagor's mistake). Although directly in point, this
case is not cited in the majority opinion, the dissent, or the briefs of counsel.
9 Noyes v. Anderson, 124 N. Y. 175, 26 N. E. 316 (1891); Germania
Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 124 App. Div. 814, 109 N. Y. Supp. 435 (1st Dep't
1908). Contra: Hockett v. Burns, 90 Neb. 1, 132 N. W. 718 (1911);
Weiner v. Cullens, 97 N. J. Eq. 523, 128 Atl. 176 (1925). Cf. Trowbridge
v. Malex Realty Corp., 198 App. Div. 656, 191 N. Y. Supp. 97 (1st Dep't
1921); (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 672; (1922) 22 CoL. L. R v. 266.
1o The practice of mortgage investment houses in New Haven and New
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PERPETUITIES-APPLICABILITY OF RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATiON TO CaA R-
TiEs.-The plaintiff, as vendor, sought specific performance of a contract
for the sale of real estate acquired by the following provisions of a will:
"Where we life [live], house and land, to go to the Presbyterian Church of
Salem, not to be sold, but for help in the future (for church and parsonage)
as the town and church may need." In answer to the defendant's contention
that the title was unmarketable, the plaintiff claimed that the restraint on
alienation contained in the will was void. The court held the title unmarket-
able on the ground that the rule against perpetuities which renders a con-
dition against all alienation void does not apply to charitable uses. Trzstces
of First Presbyterian Church of Town of Salem v,. Wheclcr, 149 Atl. 589
(N. J. 1930).
It is frequently said that gifts to charities are not subject to the rule
against perpetuities.' Although a "perpetuity" has been defined as "an
inalienable indestructible interest" 2 the rule against perpetuities is not
a rule against the restraint of alienation but rather against the creation
of remote contingent interests.3 All devises must vest, if at all, within
the period prescribed by this rule.4 Thus although charitable trusts may
be an exception to the general rule which forbids the creation of a
"perpetuity," in that they may be of limitless duration s or restrain the
alienation of property indefinitelyu it cannot be said that gifts to charities
are not subject to the "rule against perpetuities" correctly viewed as a
"rule against remoteness."" Since the gift in the instant case vested
in praesenti the rule against perpetuities did not affect its validity or in-
validity.8 Though the result reached seems sound enough the misleading
York points to the conclusion that, in circumstances such as existed in the
Graf and Petterson cases, foreclosure would never be brought without first
communicating with the mortgagor. This raises an interesting query as
to the proper relation between the standards to be imposed by courts of
equity and the general mores of the business community.
. Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 Atl. 1072 (1896); Decker v.
Vreeland, 170 App. Div. 234, 156 N. Y. S. 442 (2d Dep't 1915).
2 GRAY, PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) 472.
3 Clark, Unenforceable Trusts and the Rule Againt Perpctuities (1911)
10 Miom. L. REv. 31; Anderson, The Modern Rule Against Perpetuitics
(1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 862. Prof. Gray states: "A perpetuity could
arise in two ways, first, by taking from the owner the power to alienate
property; secondly, by allowing interests to be created in futuro. In the
beginning these ideas were confounded; gradually they were differentiated;
the first gave rise to the Rule forbidding restraints on alienation, the
second to the Rule against Perpetuities." Gray, Rezntcness of Charitable
Gifts (1894) 7 HARV. L. Rv. 406, 409.
4 Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584 (1866); Jansen v. Godair, 292 Ill.
364, 127 N. E. 97 (1920); ZoLLNuwN, ASERicAN LAW oF CHJUTiES (1924)
§ 547.
S Odell v. Odell, 42 Mass. 1 (1865); Camp v. Crocker's Adm'r, 54 Conn.
21, 5 Atl. 604 (1886) ; ZOLLA Nx, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 530.
6Delaware Land & Development Co. v. First and Central Presbyterian
Church, 147 AtI. 165 (Del. 1929) ; ZOLLTANN, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 530.
7 See 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. 1911) § 730; GRAY, op. cit.
supra, note 2, at § 591-597.
s See KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1905) 382.
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and inaccurate use of this famous rule as a basis for the decision serves
only to perpetuate the already sufficiently confused understanding of the
rule.9
WILLS-VALIDITY Op WILLS EXECUTED ON UNCONNECTED SHEETS.-
Twenty-eight sheets of note-paper, found in a sealed envelope within an
unsealed envelope, were offered for probate as decedent's will. Each sheet
was in her handwriting, and signed, numbered, and endorsed at the top;
but each was a complete entity, and the ink varied throughout the sheets.
The last page contained merely the clause of execution, decedent's signature,
and an attestation by three witnesses. These witnesses testified that the
papers presented for probate resembled the pile of note-paper to which
decedent had referred as her will, but which they had not examined. The
twenty-eight sheets were admitted to probate. On appeal it was held, one
justice dissenting, that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding
that the papers presented were the same as those executed, by decedent as
her will. Appeal of Sleeper, 151 Atl. 150 (Me. 1930).
The fact that a will is written on separate sheets does not alone invali-
date it.j Nor need the subscribing witnesses examine all the sheets.2 All
the sheets, however, must have been present in the room at the time of execu-
tion, although their presence may be inferred from other circumstances.3
Moreover in the absence of a substantial physical connection of the sheets,
other evidence must exist that all the sheets were executed as one instru-
ment. 4 Evidence of internal coherence or rhetorical unity, such as the
passing over of sentences from one sheet to another, is sufficient 5 and in
Pennsylvania is considered essential.6 In some jurisdictions probate is
ullowed where the sheets are identified by the parol evidence of disinterested
witnesses,7 and elsewhere such extrinsic evidence is admitted to strengthen
the intrinsic evidence of coherence.8 In the instant case, the sheets, although
enclosed in a sealed envelope, were properly regarded by the court as uncon-
9 See Sweet, The Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpotuitics
(1906) 18 JuR. REV. 132; Warren, Progress of the Law: Estates and Futuro
Interests (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 639, 647 et seq.
" Bond v. Seawell, 3 Burr, 1773 (1765) ; Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146
(1879) ; Paglia v. Messina, 169 N. E. 423 (Mass. 1930); Gass v. Gass, 3
Humph. 278 (Tenn. 1842); PAGE, WILLS (2d ed. 1926) § 238.
2 Bond v. Seawell, supra note 1; Owen v. Groves, 145 Ga. 287, 88 S. E.
964 (1916); Palmer v. Owen, 229 Ill. 115, 82 N. E. 275 (1907).
3Bond v. Seawell, supra note 1; Gass v. Gass, supra note 1; Ela v.
Edwards, 16 Gray 91 (Mass. 1860).
4 Maginn's Estate, 278 Pa. 89, 122 Atl. 264 (1923); In the Matter of
Johnson, 80 N. J. Eq. 525, 85 Atl. 254 (1912).
S Palmer v. Owen, supra note 2; Ela v. Edwards, supra note 3; In the
Matter of Johnson, supra note 4; In re Swaim, 162 N. C. 213, 78 S. E. 72
(1913) ; Sellarda v. Kirby, 82 Kan. 291, 108 Pac. 73 (1910) ; PAGE, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at § 241.
6 Seiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 108 Atl. 614 (1919); Maginn's Estate,
supra note 4; Maginn's Estate, 281 Pa. 514, 127 Atl. 79 (1924) ; cf. Wikoff's
Appeal, 15 Pa, 281 (1850) (validity largely dependent on republication by
codicil); (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 743.
r Murphy v. Clancy, 177 Mo. App. 429, 163 S. W. 915 (1914); Cole v.
Webb, 220 Ky. 817, 295 S. W. 1035 (1927).
8In the Matter of Johnson, supra note 4; in re Swaim, supra note 5;
Gass v. Gass, supra note 1.
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nectedY There was no certain identification of the sheets by the witnesses
and no intrinsic evidence of unity other than the numbering of the pages.
The court, satisfied with the protection against fraudulent substitution
afforded by the fact that the instrument was in decedents handwriting,
required only meagre proof that the sheets were executed at one time and
as one instrument.
9 Cf. Seiter's Estate, supra note 6. But see (1920) 33 H~IRv. L. Rsv. 989.
